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Civil Procedure
BY JOHN R. LEATHERS*
INTRODUCTION
During this past term, several decisions of the Kentucky ap-
pellate courts have dealt with civil procedure matters. Although
this Survey will comment on those opinions I believe to be most
significant, the practitioner should not rely on this Survey as ex-
haustive of recent developments.'
As was noted in the last Survey of civil procedure published
in the Kentucky Law Journal,2 one of the most troubling aspects
of research involving Kentucky procedural law is a lack of exten-
sive precedents or a detailed treatise. This Survey will attempt to
demonstrate that a framework developed in the prior Survey3
continues to be a helpful tool for Kentucky research-that Ken-
tucky appellate cases rely heavily on federal precedents and the
major treatises on federal law in interpreting the Kentucky civil
rules.
I. INTERVENTION
During the past term, Kentucky's appellate courts decided
two cases involving intervention under Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 24. 4 Gayner v. Packaging Service Corp.5 in-
volved a denial of the right to intervene; Ambassador College v.
" Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. J.D. 1971, University of New Mexico;
LL.M. 1973, Columbia University.
1 Other cases of the Survey period, roughly July of 1981 through July of 1982, not
discussed herein, include Department of Revenue v. Estate of Hofgesang, 627 S.W.2d 579
(Ky. 1982) (appeals); Hasty v. Shepherd, 620 S.W.2d 325 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (summary
judgment); Department of Transp. v. Gossage, No. 81-CA-548-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov.
13, 1981), reversed, No. 82-SC-177-06 (Ky. 1982) (memorandum opinion), petitionforre-
hearing filed Jan. 11, 1983.-2 Leathers, Tomasi & Hunt, Civil Procedure, 70 Ky. L.J. 551 (1981-82).
3 Id. at 551-52.
4 CR 24 is divided into three subsections relative to intervention; CR 24.01 Inter-
vention of Right, CR 24.02 Permissive Intervention and CR 24.03 Procedure. For the
complete text of the rule, see Kentucky Rules of Court (West 1982).
5 636 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
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Combs6 ordered that intervention be allowed in a case remanded
earlier for a trial. Although the rule is divided into permissive in-
tervention and intervention as of right, both cases involved inter-
vention as of right and fit well within the framework of federal
authority.
In Gayner,7 a suit had been filed by Packaging Service
against Chapnick. Chapnick claimed that he had an exclusive
right of first refusal to purchase some stock owned by Packaging
Service. Packing was concerned about what rights, if any,
Chapnick had to purchase. 8 In the course of the suit it was dis-
covered that Chapnick had insufficient funds to make the pur-
chase himself but had secured the financial backing of Gayner. 9
Gayner sought to intervene under CR 24.01(b), which provides
that a person may intervene as of right
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so sit-
uated that the disposition of the action may as a practical mat-
ter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
The court held that Gayner's interest was too remote for such in-
tervention since his interest only arose if Chapnick prevailed; in
the suit at hand his interest was only contingent. 0
In support of its decision, the court of appeals cited as au-
thority the federal counterpart of CR 24," with specific citation
to a federal district court case 2 and two federal circuit court
cases. 13 In looking to Kentucky authority, the court noted the
similarity between determining a person's status for intervention
and a person's status as a real party in interest under CR 17.01.11
6636 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1982).
7 636 S.W.2d at 658.
8 Id. at 659.
9Id.
10 Id. at 659.60.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 24 [hereinafter cited as FRCP].
12 In re Penn Central Commercial Litigation, 62 F.R.D. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd
sub nom. Shulman v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 515 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1975).13 Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
936.71 Acres of Land, 418 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1969).
14 636 S.W.2d at 660. The rule states:
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A close relationship exists among CR 17 (real party in interest),
CR 19 (indispensable party), CR 23 (class action members) and
CR 24 (intervention); 15 thus, precedents under the various rules
are mutually helpful. 6
In Ambassador College,' the Kentucky Supreme Court or-
dered the trial court to allow Ambassador College to intervene in
a case which had previously been heard on appeal. 18 Ordinarily,
intervention is not considered timely if it is sought after appeal,
although it may be allowed in unusual circumstances;19 the Am-
bassador College intervention does not really fall within the cat-
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, but
a personal representative, guardian, curator, committee of a person of un-
sound mind, trustee of an express trust, a person with whom or in whose
name a contract is made for the benefit of another, a county, municipal cor-
poration, public board or other such body, a receiver appointed by a court,
the assignee for the benefit of creditors, or a person expressly authorized by
statute to do so, may bring an action without joining the party or parties for
whose benefit it is prosecuted. Nothing herein, however, shall abrogate or
take away an individual's right to sue.
CR 17.01 Real Party in Interest (1982).
Is For the complete text of CR 17, Real Party in Interest, see supra note 14. Rule 19,
Joinder of Persons.Needed for Just Adjudication, defines "indispensible party" in CR
19.01, sets forth the procedure for the court to determine whether the action may continue
without such party in CR 19.02 and requires a claimant to set forth any such parties
known to him and the reasons why they are not joined in CR 19.03. Rule 23 sets forth the
prerequisites for a class action (CR 23.01), situations necessitating the class action form
(23.02), requirements for maintenance of the action (23.03) and additional provisions for
orders (23.04) and dismissal or compromise (23.05). For an outline of CR 24 Intervention,
see supra note 4.
16 The court can find agreement about that interrelationship in J. MooRE. MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d Ed. 1948). Moore states:
In keeping with the theory underlying revision of Rules 19, 23, and 24, the
revision defined a party needed for just adjudication in Rule 19 and used
comparable language to describe a member of a class under Rule 23 and a
person entitled to intervention as of right under Rule 24.
Id. at 24.09-1(3) [footnote omitted]. Accord Atlantis Development Corp. v. United
States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967). See discussion of J. MooRE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE (2d Ed. 1948), on the consistency designed into Rule 24 with the revisions of Rules 19
and 23, at paragraph 24.07[1].
17 636 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1982).
Is Id. at 305-06.
19 See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) which involved highly un-
usual circumstances. In that case, parents of schoolchildren in the District of Columbia
were permitted to intervene to prosecute an appeal after the local board of education de-
cided not to challenge a district court's ruling that it had violated the United States Consti-
tution in its administration of the school system.
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egory of post-appeal intervention. Thus, to read it as allowing in-
tervention after appeal would be erroneous.
In Ambassador College, the decedent left a 1974 will. After
his death, his heirs tried to set it aside as invalid because of undue
influence. 20 The trial court found the decedent had been compe-
tent at the execution of the will but made no finding on undue in-
fluence. The case was remanded by the court of appeals for a
trial on the issue of undue influence.21 Before a retrial occurred,
Ambassador College sought to intervene on the grounds that it
had a right to the property under a 1963 Will of the decedent. Its
argument was that the 1974 will was invalid either due to the
grounds asserted by the heirs or due to an inability of the dece-
dent to change his 1963 will because of a contract between the
decedent and his wife in favor of Ambassador College.22 The
position of Ambassador College, then, was independent of the
grounds of either the plaintiffs or the defendants in the action.
The Court ordered the intervention of Ambassador for
reasons that seem obvious. Ambassador had an interest that
would be adversely affected should the property pass as directed
under the 1974 will or under intestacy. Neither of the parties to
the action had a position favorable to Ambassador and thus its in-
terests were not represented.0 The intervention allowed here is
consistent with federal authority that a delay of years in seeking
intervention will not by itself disqualify a party from interven-
tion. 24 In addition, federal decisions imply that intervention by a
new party on remand is allowable,2 and that intervention may
be permitted upon the reopening of a case even by parties earlier
denied intervention after the case had closed. 26
One significant difference between state intervention prob-
lems and federal intervention problems should be noted so that
inapplicable federal case law can be avoided. One common fed-
eral intervention problem arises from the desire of an intervenor
20 636 S.W.2d at 305.
21 Id.
2 Id. at 306.
2' Id. at 306-07.
24 2BJ. MooRE, supra note 16, at 24.13(1).
2s See McKenna v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 303 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1962).
2 See New York v. United States, 65 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 1974).
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to assert a ground or argument totally different from the grounds
being asserted by existing parties. In federal court, the additional
claims often encounter problems with subject matter jurisdiction
and a good bit of federal case law concerns those jurisdictional
problems.-* This kind of intervention problem results from the
position of federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction and
does not apply in state courts that have general jurisdiction.
Aside from this area, federal authority on intervention is helpful
in deciding Kentucky cases and seems to have been followed in
these two recent Kentucky cases.
II. TRIAL BYDEPOSITION
The last civil procedure Survey criticizede the decision of the
court of appeals in Stafford v. Stafford. 9 In that decision, the
court stated that review of trial court fact findings in trials by
deposition was not governed by the "clearly erroneous" standard
of CR 52.01. 30 The Stafford court contended that since it was as
qualified as a trial court to review such evidence, the normal rule
of deference to the fact finder did not apply. 3' That holding was
criticized as being unwise policy and as being unjustified by the
two Kentucky precedents cited by the court.3 2 In Largent v. Lar-
gent,3 the court of appeals retracted its position in Stafford and
adhered to the "clearly erroneous" standard normally applied to
fact review by appellate courts. The Supreme Court of Kentucky
granted discretionary review of the case and affirmed applica-
tion of the "clearly erroneous" standard to trials by deposition.34
The court of appeals opinion in Largent implies that the Staf-
ford language resulted from an erroneous application of prior
27 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1921 (1972).
2 Leathers, Tomasi & Hunt, supra note 2, at 551.
2' 618 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
30 Id. at 580. CR 52.01 states that the "[flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous."
3' 618 S.W.2d at 580.32 Leathers, Tomasi & Hunt, supra note 2, at 560-61.
"3 No. 81-CA-61-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1981) (28 Ky. LAW SUMM. 16, at 3
[hereinafter KLS], affirmed, 643 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1982).
34 643 S.W.2d at 261. The Supreme Court decision was rendered after this Survey
article was written; hence, the textual discussion focuses on the court of appeals opinion.
See note 43 infra for a reference to the Supreme Court opinion.
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Kentucky case law. In both Burchett v. Jones35 and Bush v.
Putty,- the Kentucky appellate courts indicated that the "clearly
erroneous" standard did not apply to review of trials by deposi-
tion. These cases created an exception to the plain language of
CR 52.01, which contains no hint that its standard does not
apply to all cases. In Largent, the court found, as the previous
Survey article posited, that both Burchett and Bush were cases in
which reversals were justified based on the "clearly erroneous"
standard.37 Although the court does not comment at length on
Stafford, the same finding would be true for that case.-, Thus,
anything that was said in Burchett, Bush and Stafford about the
broader standard of review was dicta; it had never been held that
a broader review standard applied since a narrower test covered
all three cases. Largent was the first fact pattern to put the court
to the test of whether it would actually deviate from the normal
review standard and make a special rule for trials by deposition.
For sound policy reasons, the court of appeals refused to make
such an exception.
The effect of deviation from the "clearly erroneous" standard
would be a disaster for appellate courts. There is no reason to
suppose that such de novo review of these cases would end with
the court of appeals; under the reasoning of Stafford, fact find-
ings might even get such review again in the Kentucky Supreme
Court. The obvious theory behind appellate practice is that fact
findings are left to the trial level so that appellate courts can
grapple with difficult issues of law; only when a finding is so un-
supported as to be erroneous as a matter of law will an appeals
court concern itself with fact disputes. A special rule such as that
indicated by Stafford would work a fundamental change in that
basic appellate focus.
In Largent, the court of appeals indicated that the normal
review standard of "clearly erroneous" should apply in all cases
for two reasons. First, the court recognized the immense burden
35 291 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1956).
36 566 S.W.2d 819 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
37 28 KLS 16 at 4.
38 Concerning the applicability of CR 52.01, the court of appeals in Largent ac-
knowledged that the court in Stafford said the Rule was not on point. The court character-
ized that aspect of Stafford as dictum. 28 KLS 16 at 3.
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placed upon it by giving de novo review to trials by deposition;
the court simply did not want tie additional burden.39 Secondly,
the court recognized that a trial judge did in fact have opportuni-
ties to arrive at a judgment of the credibility of the parties despite
the fact that the trial was by deposition. 40 In Largent, which in-
volved a request for a change of child custody, that opportunity
came from having presided over the divorce of the parties. In
other cases, such opportunity could come from many places, in-
cluding knowing parties or witnesses, having had the same par-
ties in other cases, or from the extensive motion practice which is
now so common in our courts. 41
The facts in Largent show that the court adhered to the
"clearly erroneous" standard. Despite the court's previous con-
clusion that the trial court finding was unjustified,42 on rehearing
the court upheld the trial court. This means that despite its own
opinion of the facts, the court deferred to the trial judge since
there was support in the record to keep his conclusions from be-
ing totally erroneous. Faced for the first time with a fact situa-
tion in which a different review standard could have been for-
mulated, the court upon reflection refused to abandon the
"clearly erroneous" standard. The court commendably retreated
from its prior statements to reach a necessary conclusion. The
Supreme Court on review has affirmed this result. 43
III. SUPREMACY OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE
It is not uncommon in any procedural system for the rules ap-
plicable to litigation to conflict with rules of law enacted by the
legislative branch of government." The problem is difficult
enough in a jurisdiction in which both the procedural rules and
3 28 KLS 16, at 4.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 No. 81-CA-61-MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 24, 1981), rev'd on reh'g (Ky. Ct. App.
Dec. 11, 1981), affirmed, 643 S.W.2d at 261.
43 The Kentucky Supreme Court did affirm, stating that the clearly erroneous stand-
ard applies to cases tried solely by deposition. Largent v. Largent, 643 S.W.2d at 261. The
Court held that to the extent Bush and Stafford held otherwise, they were in error. Id.
44 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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the substantive rules are legislative; the problem is still more
complicated in a jurisdiction like Kentucky where the formation
of procedural rules is constitutionally delegated to the judicial
branch. 45 Such a conflict is, in addition to the ordinary conflict
between the litigants, between two branches of the same sover-
eign government. The Kentucky Court of Appeals faced exactly
this type of clash in Perry v. Commonwealth.46 The Supreme
Court has granted discretionary review of the case so a final dis-
position is yet forthcoming.
Perry involved an action brought on behalf of the mother of a
child against the putative father to determine paternity, an ac-
tion now clearly held in Kentucky to be civil in nature. 47 The
plaintiff moved pursuant to CR 35.0148 that the defendant be or-
dered to submit to a blood test to determine paternity. The de-
fendant-father objected to the test on the grounds that under
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 406.08149 only he could
request such a test and that the plaintiff had no right to ask for
such a test. 0 The district court denied the motion to compel the
examination. On appeal, the Jefferson Circuit Court ruled that
such examinations must be available to both parties. 5' The reason
for this decision was that the statute limiting such availability to
defendants was unconstitutionally discriminatory as to sex-test-
ing would always be available to defendants (all male) and un-
available to plaintiffs (all female).
While upholding the right of the mother to demand that the
defendant submit to a physical examination, the court of appeals
45 See Ky. CONST. § 116.46 No. 80-CA-1615-DG (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1982), as modified (Ky. Ct. App.
Apr. 1, 1982) (29 KLS 3, at 1), discretionary review granted, No. 82-SC-220-D (Ky. May
18, 1982). Oral arguments were scheduled for Mar. 13, 1983.
4729 KLS 3, at 1.
48 CR 35.01 states: "When the mental or physical condition (including the blood
group) of a party... is in controversy, the ourt ... may order the party to submit to a
physical or mental examination .... The terms of the Rule would make such examina-
tion available at the request of either party.
49 Ky. REV. STAT. § 406.081 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS] provides
in part: "The court, upon timely motion of the defendant, shall order the mother, child
and alleged father to submit to blood tests." (emphasis added).
50 29 KLS 3, at 1-2.
51 Id. at 1.5 2 Id. at 2.
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in Perry did not rule that the statute in question was unconstitu-
tional. Rather the court chose to rule that the constitutionality of
the statute was saved by the fact that, when read in conjunction
with CR 35.01, examinations were available upon the request of
either party.0 It would appear that the court read the statute as
granting the right to demand an examination to the father, but
not as denying such a right to the mother. Thus, the right of the
mother to demand an examination was supplied by the rule since
the statute was silent. 54 In this fashion, the court avoided ruling
on the constitutionality of the statute if given the reading urged
by the father-that the statute was the exclusive source of the
right to compel a blood test in these circumstances. The court ex-
pressed severe doubts about the constitutionality of the statute if
such a contention had prevailed. s
The opinion of the court of appeals in Perry contains a
lengthy and somewhat confusing discussion of the status of CR
35.01.56 The discussion in itself is not confusing. What is unclear
is why the discussion is included at all. The court concludes the
discussion with the observation that "the citizens of this Com-
monwealth have directed that the Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the Court
of Justice."57 Apparently, the court meant that even had the stat-
ute been construed to constitutionally preclude an examination
at the request of the mother, then CR 35.01 allowing such right
to either party would have prevailed over the statute.
The court's implicit notion that a rule of civil procedure
would prevail over a contrary statute is evidenced by the federal
precedents it cites. The court, in finding that the provisions of
CR 35.01 were valid, cites Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 8 as one of
two leading federal cases.59 Sibbach is a part of the famous line of
5' Id. at 1-2.
4 Such a construction seems to ignore the statutory construction maxim inclusio
unlus est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another). The
maxim has been used in Kentucky in such cases as Burgin v. Forbes, 169 S.W.2d 321 (Ky.
1943).
529 KLS 3, at 1.
5 6 Id. at 2.57 Id.
58 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
9 The other case cited was Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); that case is
not discussed in this analysis of Perry.
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cases flowing from Erie R.R. v. Tompkins0 and was the first case
to uphold the validity of a federal rule against a challenge based
on the Erie doctrine and the Rules Enabling Act.61 At first glance
the Sibbach holding (that a valid rule prevails over a contrary
state law, statutory or decisional)62 seems to support the court's
conclusions concerning the status of CR 35.01 and the doubtful
constitutionality of a reading of the paternity statute adverse to
mothers.
In reality, there is a significant difference between Sibbach
and Perry which may cast great light on the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers in Kentucky. Sibbach allows a rule to prevail over
contrary state law; but read closely it will be observed that Sib-
bach allows a federal rule to prevail over state decisional law.6 It
had long been clear that a valid federal rule will prevail over con-
trary state statutory provisions.64 Of course, no other result
would be possible under the supremacy clause5 of the United
States Constitution. But apparently, no federal case holds that a
federal rule would prevail over a contraryfederal statute.
If the paternity statute in Perry did deny the mother the right
to compel an examination, how could it be said that CR 35
would prevail over the statute? The answer might lie in funda-
mental differences between the rule-making authority of the fed-
eral and state judicial branches. In the federal system, authority
to make procedural rules is granted to the Supreme Court by the
Congress through the Rules Enabling Act." Prior to passage of
that act, federal courts applied the procedural rules of the state
in which they sat under the direction of the Conformity Act.67 In
reality, then, the federal rules are statutes since the power to en-
act them came from Congress and since Congress has the final
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
61 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
62 312 U.S. at 16.
6 3 Id.
64 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 460.
65 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
6 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
67 28 U.S.C. § 724 (repealed 1948).
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say on their becoming law.6 Thus, a federal rule could not pre-
vail in the face of constitutionally valid congressional action.6
In Kentucky, the source of authority for the Supreme Court
to make procedural rules comes not from General Assembly ac-
tion, but directly from the Kentucky Constitution.7" This means
that a conflict between a valid rule and a statutory provision does
not involve the sort of conflicts present in federal rule cases: con-
flict between state and federal law and conflict between a fed-
eral rule and a later act of Congress. The conflict in Kentucky is
between two separate but equal branches of government-the
judiciary and the legislature. The clear implication of the court
of appeals opinion in Perry is that a judicial rule found to be
within the category of "procedure" under the Sibbach test7' will
prevail over any contrary legislative provision. This should not be
surprising since the judiciary has the last word on the matter. In-
deed, the legislature in Kentucky has in recent times lost a con-
test with another of the Supreme Court's creations, the Kentucky
Bar Association. 72
All of this may appear inconsequential if one takes the sim-
plistic view that, if the matter is "really procedural," 73 then of
course it is within the legitimate control of the judiciary. The
problem, as has been made clear in the federal system, is that
some matters (both in statutes and in rules) cut across both sub-
stance and procedure because they actually involve both con-
cepts. 74 The federal position has been that, when the classifica-
tion is ambiguous, a federal rule prevails over a contrary state
provision; 75 this is a reasonable position, given that federal con-
8 See the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) that the rules do not become law
until 90 days after the Chief Justice reports them to Congress.
19 Rules in conflict with preexisting statutes would prevail due to the terms of the
Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). Statutes enacted subsequent to the rules would prevail as
the normal result of handling conflicting statutes.
70 Ky. CONST. § 116.
71 The test is less than clear. "The test must be whether a rule really regulates proce-
dure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." 312
U.S. at 14.
72 See Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980).
73 See note 71 supra for the test.
74 E.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
75 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 360.
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trol is supreme whatever label be attached to the area. But to im-
port that idea into Kentucky law is to give incredible power to
the judiciary. If that reasoning should prevail in Kentucky, then
the judiciary would be first among equals. The balance of power
between the branches of state government is delicate and the
rough tools used in the federal-state balancing6 may not be suit-
able to the wholly intra-state setting in cases like Perry. For the
moment, we might rest easily by remembering that this implica-
tion in Perry is dicta, given the construction of the paternity act
adopted by the court of appeals.77 But let us not rest too easily;
judicial intervention into defining the roles of the governmental
branches is on the upswing78 and the reasoning outlined here
makes the matter considerably dangerous. Practitioners should
be alert to the Kentucky Supreme Court's upcoming decision of
the case.
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR NON-MOVING PARTY
Courts in Kentucky are authorized to enter a summary judg-
ment for a moving party in appropriate circumstances under CR
56, whether the moving party is a claimant or a defending
party.79 Although the rule does not expressly address the situa-
tion, a court may believe summary judgment is improper for the
moving party, but should be granted to the non-moving party. In
this past term, the Kentucky Supreme Court again has indicated
that the Kentucky position is that a court may grant summary
judgment for the non-moving party without requiring a cross-
motion by such party. 0
In Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Commission,8'
the Court indicated that the Bourbon Circuit Court did have the
authority to grant a summary judgment for the Planning Com-
76 See Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 Hous. L. REv.
(1974), for a discussion of federal-state balancing.
77 See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra for an analysis of the court's interpreta-
tion of the paternity statute.
78 See, e.g., Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1982).
79 CR 56.01 authorizes judgment for claimants; CR 56.02 allows the device to de-
fending parties.




mission upon the motion of Green, without the Commission hav-
ing made a cross-motion for summary judgment.82 This state-
ment appears to be dicta, however, since the lower court decision
was actually reversed on the ground that the summary judgment
should not have been granted due to the existence of material
facts requiring a trial on the merits." In upholding in theory such
practice by the trial judge, the Court followed its previous posi-
tion in Collins v. Duff.84
In justifying its decision to allow summary judgment for a
non-moving party, the Court quoted a passage from Collins,5
which cited both federal trial court cases86 and Moore's Federal
Practice. 87In so doing, the Court followed the federal position, in
which "It]he great weight of authority . . dispenses with the
formality of a cross-motion and supports the.., position of the
Treatise ' 8 that summary judgment should be available in favor
of a non-moving party. Indeed, the number of federal cases up-
holding such power cited by this section of Moore exceeds
twenty-five. 8 The position of Wright and Miller in Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure also supports "the practice of allowing sum-
mary judgment to be entered for the nonmoving party in the ab-
sence of a formal cross-motion."0
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this
power in the federal system. Although it has been proposed that
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 56 be amended to ex-
pressly allow such practice, 91 the Advisory Committee to the
82 Id. at 629-30.
83 Id. at 630.
'4 283 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Ky. 1955). Collins was the first case m which the Court
recognized that a non-moving party may be granted a summary judgment.
8' 637 S.W.2d at 629-30.
8 Hennessey v. Federal Sec. Adm'r, 88 F Supp. 664 (D. Conn. 1949); Hooker v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Ill. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 161
F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1947).
87 The Court in Collins v. Duff, 283 S.W.2d at 179, cited 3J. MOORE, MooRE's FED-
ERAL PRACTEC § 56.02 (1st ed. 1938). 6 J. MOOaE, supra note 16, at 56.12, is the corre-
sponding section in Moore's second edition.
8 6J. MooRE,supra note 16, at 56.12.
89 Id. at 56.12n.6.
90 10 C. WRicHT & A. MILLER, supra note 27, at § 2720.
91 See, e.g., Truncale v. Blumberg, 8 F.R.D. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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United States Supreme Court has refused to recommend such an
amendment. Former United States Supreme Court Justice Tom
Clark, a well-known and respected authority on the federal
rules, has argued that the bulk of case law allowing such practice
indicates that federal trial judges perceive the merit of the posi-
tion even if the Advisory Committee does not. 92
All of this indicates a need for caution on the part of the prac-
titioner. Although Kentucky law seems clear from Green and
Collins,93 and although the great weight of federal authority
agrees,94 the issue in some respects is still open. Until the United
States Supreme Court rules on this or FRCP 56 is amended, par-
ties who have a judgment entered against them after their own
motion for summary judgment will be able to argue against such
practice. Admittedly, the refusal of the Advisory Committee to
recommend an amendment is significant in interpreting the rule.
Kentucky would not be obliged to follow any federal de-
velopments contrary to Green and Collins, but the state's close
adherence to most federal positions might lead one to such a con-
clusion. For the practitioner in both federal and state courts in
Kentucky, there is one obvious and easy way in which to avoid
the problem: always move for summary judgment in response to
an opponent's motion. Even an oral cross-motion would suffice
to avoid having to argue the issue posed here concerning non-
moving parties. 95
For the practitioner caught in the rather embarrassing posi-
tion of suffering a loss based on his own motion, several options
may be open. The most obvious is to question the availability of
judgment to a non-moving party. This might not be a fruitful ef-
fort, but is worth putting in the record. The more likely escape is
to argue to the court that material issues of fact remain to be de-
cided. It is inconsistent to argue that fact issues exist when the
practitioner has, by filing his or her own motion, just contended
to the court that there are no fact issues. Nevertheless, nothing in
92 Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. Rav. 567,570-71 (1951-52).
93 See text accompanying notes 79-88 supra for a discussion of the Kentucky position
as indicated by Green and Collins.
94 See text accompanying notes 88-92 supra for an indication of the extent to which
the weight of federal authority supports this proposition.
95 See Tripp v. May, 189 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1951).
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the rules requires an advocate to be consistent; indeed, there is
specific authority for the taking of alternate and inconsistent
positions. 9 As authority for such an argument, the practitioner
should cite Green.97 The result in Green was to order the case
back for trial on unresolved issues of fact, 9s despite the fact that
the losing party in the trial court had argued in his summary
judgment motion that there were no issues of fact. This inconsis-
tency seems not to have bothered the Kentucky Supreme Court.
V. CONTEMPT OF COURT
In yet another case potentially involving the separation of
powers problem, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Hardin v.
Summitt99 construed a state statute so as to avoid a conflict. In so
doing, the Court gave some insight into the inherent contempt
powers of the Kentucky courts.
Curtis Hardin was called by the Commonwealth as a witness
in two criminal prosecutions pending in the Oldham Circuit
Court. Hardin refused to testify upon two separate occasions and
was held in contempt by the circuit court judge for this refusal. 10
He was imprisoned pursuant to KRS section 421.140.101 Follow-
ing the conviction of the defendants in both criminal cases and
assessment of the death penalty against them, Hardin was kept in
custody under the order of the circuit judge0 2 apparently under
the theory that, within the meaning of KRS section 421.140, the
criminal cases had as yet not reached "final disposition" since
both cases were appealed.103
96 CR 8.05(2) provides in part: "A party may also state as many separate claims or
defenses as he has regardless of consistency."
97 637 S.W.2d at 626.
8 Id. at 630.
9 627 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1981).
1oo Id. at 581.
101 KRS § 421.140 (Cum. Supp. 1982) provides:
If a witness refuses to testify, or to be sworn, or to give a deposition, he shall
be imprisoned so long as he refuses, or until he testifies before an officer who
is authorized to take his testimony. The final disposition of the case in which
he so refuses shall discharge him from imprisonment.




In reviewing the actions of the circuit judge, the Kentucky
Supreme Court ruled that under the statute the power of im-
prisonment ended when the trial in circuit court ended,'1 not
following the disposition on appeal. The rationale of the Court
was that the purpose of the statute was to secure testimony for
the trial courts.'15 Once the trial court proceeding was over, there
was no longer any valid reason to attempt to coerce Hardin.l16
In so holding, the Court stated that it did "not reach the
question of whether KRS section 421.140 unduly limits the inher-
ent power of the courts to punish for contempt."' 7 In an earlier
case, Arnett v. Meade, °0 the Court had held that the predecessor
version of KRS section 421.140 unconstitutionally limited the
courts' power to punish for contempt. "I
Actually, the Court in Hardin was able to "avoid" the prob-
lem because no real issue was present; the statute, as interpreted,
seems coextensive with the constitutional limits of court con-
tempt authority imposed by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution." 0 This
seems implicit from the federal cases chosen by the Court to sup-
port its conclusion that Hardin could no longer be confined."'
The type of contempt punishment imposed upon Hardin was
civil in nature because its purpose was to compel him to testify. 12
Although coercive, such punishment was not criminal in
nature." 3 The United States Supreme Court in Shillitani v.




101 462 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1971).
log Id. at 948. The version of KRS § 421.140 ruled unconstitutional in Arnett limited
punishment for contempt to a fine of $30, imprisonment for 24 hours, and coercive im-
prisonment for continued refusal to testify not extending beyond final disposition of the
case. The statute was amended by Act of Dec. 22, 1976, ch. 14, § 423, 1976 Ky. Acts (Ex.
Sess.) 164, to delete the limits of $30 and 24 hours. See note 101 supra for the text of the
statute as it now appears.
"0 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1 See 627 S.W.2d at 581-82. The Court cited Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364 (1966); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418 (1911).
112 627 S.W.2d at 581.
113 Id. at 582.
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United States"4 set forth a functional test for classifying contempt
sanctions. The test looked to the purpose of the contempt to
determine whether it was civil or criminal in nature."5 Hardin,
as in the typical civil contempt, had the "keys to the jail" in his
own hands, meaning that he could have purged himself by tes-
tifying as directed. Once the trial was over, he could no longer so
purge himself. 6 To incarcerate him at that time would be puni-
tive in nature.17 It should be noted that, except for fairly minor
incidents of criminal contempt, a jury trial in criminal contempt
proceedings is required by Bloom v. Illinois.1I8 If the Kentucky
Supreme Court had indicated that Hardin was to be incarcerated
during the pendency of the appeal when he had no practical
means to purge himself, the contempt would have become crim-
inal in nature and the imposition of such punishment without a
jury trial would have violated the rule of Bloom. Thus, by its
construction of KRS section 421.140, the Court saved itself a con-
frontation not only with the legislature but also with the require-
ments of federal law. The decision in Hardin appears then to be
highly politic as well as based on sound legal reasoning.
Although the Court in Hardin did cite to federal case author-
ity,"9 the usage does not support the basic thesis of this Article
and the previous Survey that Kentucky courts look to federal law
for guidance in shaping Kentucky practice120 In the normal in-
stance, Kentucky is free to adopt whatever rule it sees fit, and
federal law is used as a role model for determining Kentucky
law. In cases like Hardin, federal law serves a different function.
Federal law in such cases sets the outer dimensions of the choices
open to the Kentucky courts. Under the supremacy clause,'2' fed-
eral law will prevail in such cases. Thus, the discussion of federal
law in Hardin2' was necessary in order to avoid the adoption of a
i14 384 U.S. at 364.
"1 Id. at 370.
"a 627 S.W.2d at 582.
117 Id.
118 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
119 See note 111 supra for the federal cases cited by the Kentucky court.
120 See text accompanying note 3 supra and Leathers, Tomasi & Hunt, supra note 2,
at 551-52 for a more thorough discussion of this thesis.
121 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
12 627 S.W.2d at 581-82.
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rule that would have exceeded the constitutional limits of state
authority. This is an important distinction and should be kept
firmly in mind by practitioners.
VI. ATTORNEY FEES IN SECTION 1983 SUITS
During the past term, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
considered in Scott v. Campbell County Board of Education'23
the question of availability of attorney's fees to the prevailing
party in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.12 Such
suits are familiar to most practitioners; their thrust is recovery of
damages for a deprivation of federally guaranteed rights, either
statutory or constitutional, by a person acting under color of
state law. In addition to creating the basic cause of action, fed-
eral law creates the possibility of an award of counsel fees to the
prevailing party. 12
In Scott, a teacher prevailed in his claim that the Campbell
County Board of Education infringed his federally-created rights
when the Board dismissed him from a teaching position. 2 6 Judg-
ment in the teacher's favor was entered by the Campbell Circuit
Court on March 30, 1977; the judgment was affirmed on appeal
and a mandate issued on March 16, 1979.12 More than one year
later, on May 16, 1980, the plaintiff moved for an award of at-
torney's fees.12
The question presented in Scott was whether the plaintiffs
motion for an award of counsel fees came too late. The court of
123 618 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
1'24 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action in law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
125 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980). Under § 1988, "the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." Id.





appeals noted that the issue of timely assertion of such claims had
led to a split of authority in the federal appellate courts.', The
Fifth Circuit has ruled that such an award is not a part of the
prior judgment and hence not subject to the time limitations for
alteration of a judgment.1s The First and Fourth Circuits have
held that such awards are ancillary to the underlying judgment
and that claims of fees must be made as timely additions to the
primary judgment.' In Scott, the court of appeals agreed with
the latter position and ruled that the plaintiffs attempt to secure
fees was untimely. 32
The conflict among the circuits noted above has now been re-
solved by the United States Supreme Court. In White v. New
Hampshire Department of Employment Security,' the Court
held that requests for counsel fees were not governed by the ten-
day requirements of FRCP 59(e). 134 As the basis for this holding,
the Court stated that the procedural rule was designed to fore-
close delayed challenges to the merits of a case. The Court
reasoned that counsel fees did not fall within the rule because
such fees were collateral to the merits of the case."3s The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals' reliance on contrary federal authority to
support its decision in Scott thus cannot stand in view of this
United States Supreme Court decision.
Even aside from the United States Supreme Court holding,
the Scott court's use of the Fourth Circuit decision in Gary v.
Spires"' seems misplaced. In Gary, the losing defendants had
chosen not to appeal the adverse trial court judgment; thent an
129 Id. at 591.
130 Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 451 U.S.
935 (1981), reh'g granted, 640 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part, remanded in part,
654 F.2d 304, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1255 (1982).
131 Gary v. Spires, 634 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1980); White v. New Hampshire Dep't of
Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980), revd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982). See text
accompanying notes 133-35 infra for a discussion of this reversal.
132 618 S.W.2d at 591.
133 455 U.S. at 445.
134 Federal Rule 59 pertains to new trials and the amendment of judgments. Section
(e), Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment, states: "A motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."
13 455 U.S. at 451.
136 634 F.2d at 772.
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award of fees was made. 1-17As is noted in Gary, one factor which
may have motivated the defendants not to appeal was the small
size of the judgment against them.13s In the absence of fees, the
judgment may not have seemed worth an appeal; with the addi-
tion of fees, such an appeal might have seemed more attrac-
tive.139 Given this factor, it only seemed fair not to increase the
amount of the judgment when the time for appeal had passed.
Factors such as this one might be relevant in cases like Gary but
are not present in a case like Scott where an appeal was vigorous-
ly prosecuted by defendants.
As a further reason to disallow the late granting of fees, the
Scott court cited a difference between FRCP 58 and CR 58 con-
cerning the effective entry of judgments.'40 The federal rule ex-
pressly states that "entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for
the taxing of costs,"'' while the Kentucky rule contains no such
statement. Care must be taken in using this distinction to justify
the disallowance of fees. The implication of the court's observa-
tion seems to be that a state procedural rule can prevent a plain-
tiff from securing a federally created right. Given the United
States Supreme Court decision in White, such a reading is troub-
ling should the Kentucky courts try to adhere to Scott on this
ground.
The underlying cause of action in Scott is federally created. 142
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce that fed-
erally-created right; 14 indeed, it may well be that state courts are
required to provide a forum for that federally-created right. 144
The right of a prevailing party to recover fees also is federally
created.' 45With the federal position in White clearly supporting
137 Id. at 773.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 618 S.W.2d at 591.
141 FRCP 58.
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying
text for a description of the federally created cause of action being discussed here.
143 Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980).
144 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). But see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
at 283n.7.
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980). See note 125 supra for the relevant text of
section 1988. Although the language of the statute leaves an award of fees to the discretion
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a fee award, the court of appeals' position relying on CR 58's dif-
ference from its federal counterpart sets the stage for a confronta-
tion between a state procedural rule and the assertion of a fed-
eral right. There is some authority for the proposition that state
procedural requirements, even in civil cases, cannot prevent a
person from securing a federal right."" While there is some doubt
about the exact meaning of that authority,'47 apparently a state
could meet the federal requirements as to a challenged rule by
showing that the rule served a legitimate state purpose and did
not apply solely to federal cases.' 48
The question which remains in Scott after White is whether,
based on the lack of a Kentucky rule similar to FRCP 58 and on a
different Kentucky interpretation of CR 59.05, Kentucky can
reach a different result than White on timeliness of applications
for counsel fees in cases based on federal law. Although this is a
close question, it seems that the state can adhere to Scott if it
wishes. In White, the Supreme Court stated that this was an
issue about which federal courts were free to adopt local rules on
timeliness. 1 9 It seems that if the Court would allow such a prac-
tice, it should allow states to have different policies, so long as
they are legitimate, fair, and not designed to thwart federal pol-
icies.
The rule which results from Scott seems to serve a legitimate
state purpose. All litigation simply must be final at some point. If
the position of the plaintiff in Scott were taken to its logical ex-
treme, an attempt to recover fees would be timely twenty years
after the entry of an underlying judgment. The recovery of fees is
granted because a party has prevailed in his underlying cause of
action; to separate that right from the underlying case seems ridi-
culous. The effect would be to create a separate cause of action
for attorney's fees without any statute of limitations other than
of the trial court, it would normally be assumed that such fees are to be awarded. See
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), for treatment of fees under
Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 204(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1976).
"' See Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
147 See Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 944 (1965).
148 See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); cf. Ward v. Love County, 253
U.S. 17 (1920).
149 White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 102 S. Ct. at 1168.
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the discretion of the court. It makes a good deal more sense to
treat the claim as what it is-derivative from the underlying case
and therefore attached to that case and subject to the same lim-
itations as that case. States have a legitimate forum interest in
protecting against tardy fee requests in state fact settings and,
hence, Kentucky should be free to adopt its own rule.
CONCLUSION
The cases in this term continue the trends noted in the past
Survey article.15° Kentucky is still considerably tied to interpreta-
tions identical to those involving the federal rules. The cases
chosen this year do not demonstrate the preference noted in Ken-
tucky decisions in previous years for Wright and Miller over
Moore as authority, 5' but the totality of cases indicates that the
trend continues.
The Kentucky Supreme Court and the Kentucky Court of
Appeals seem to be having some difficulty dealing with federal-
ism problems. As discussed in this Survey, the courts find it diffi-
cult to articulate just exactly how state and federal law relate to
each other.
Finally, I would note the tendency of the courts to be overly
assertive of judicial power over other state government divisions.
The use of the term "procedure" serves only to mask the issue and
to invite bootstrapping by the judiciary. The court of appeals'
implicit assertion in Perry v. Commonwealth5 of the judiciary's
position as first among equals is alarming and warrants close ob-
servation in the future.
15 See Leathers, Tornasi & Hunt, supra note 2, at 551-52.
151 Id. at 552.
152 No. 80-CA-1615-DG (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1982), as modified (Ky. Ct. App.
Apr. 1, 1982), discretionary review granted, No. 82-SC-220-D (Ky. May 18, 1982). See
Part III of the text for a discussion.
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